Historical magic in old quantum theory ? by Vickers, P.
 1 
Historical Magic in Old Quantum Theory?
1
 
Peter Vickers 
 
 
Two successes of old quantum theory are particularly notable: Bohr’s prediction of the spectral 
lines of ionised helium, and Sommerfeld’s prediction of the fine-structure of the hydrogen spectral 
lines. Many scientific realists would like to be able to explain these successes in terms of the truth 
or approximate truth of the assumptions which fuelled the relevant derivations. In this paper I 
argue that this will be difficult for the ionised helium success, and is almost certainly impossible 
for the fine-structure success. Thus I submit that the case against the realist’s thesis that success 
is indicative of truth is marginally strengthened. 
 
1. Introduction. Most scientific realists claim that the success of a scientific theory is 
indicative of its truth, that we have good reason to believe in things like evolution and the 
big bang given how successful the corresponding theories are at explaining and/or 
predicting certain phenomena (such as the fossil record and cosmic microwave 
background radiation). However, it is well known that many scientific successes are born 
of theories which are false, and sometimes radically false. How can the realist maintain 
her realism in the face of this fact? 
 The common answer amongst philosophers of science today is that significant 
scientific successes usually are born of truth, even if that truth is often buried within a 
wider theoretical framework that is largely misguided. So-called ‘selective’ realists 
attempt to explain various successes in the history of science by reconstructing the 
relevant derivations so as to show that the success of a given theory depends only on 
those things it actually got right (be those things properties, structure, or whatever).2 
However, clearly even these sophisticated selective realists will be in trouble if there are 
episodes in the history of science where significant theoretical successes were quite 
obviously dependent on things the theory got wrong. In such cases one would have to 
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accept that success was not born of truth, and if several such cases could be uncovered 
it would suggest that one is ill-advised to believe our current scientific theories (or even 
their ‘best’ parts) on the basis of their success. The objective of the current paper is to 
introduce the old quantum theory (OQT) of Bohr and Sommerfeld as one such relevant 
historical episode. 
 At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century one 
phenomenon was proving particularly difficult to explain. Every element emits and 
absorbs light at only certain frequencies, which we call that element’s characteristic 
spectrum. These were first observed in the mid-nineteenth century, but proved largely 
inexplicable until Niels Bohr provided an explanation in 1913.3 His theory explained the 
discrete set of spectral lines associated with any particular element in terms of a discrete 
set of possible orbits an electron can inhabit within the atoms of that element. He had 
tremendous success in explaining the spectral lines of hydrogen and ionised helium—so 
much success, in fact, that Einstein was moved to remark, ‘This is a tremendous result. 
The theory of Bohr must then be right.’ (cited in Pais 1991, p.154). As Pais writes, 
 
Up to that time no one had ever produced anything like it in the realm of 
spectroscopy, agreement between theory and experiment to five significant figures. 
(1991, p.149) 
 
The realist would surely like to be able to explain how Bohr could be so successful with a 
theory we now know to be so fundamentally wrong.4 
 But despite Bohr’s success there were elements of the spectral lines of hydrogen 
which remained unexplained. In particular it remained unexplained why, when one looks 
closely at the spectral lines with a high resolution spectroscope, some of them are 
actually a number of separate lines grouped extremely closely together. This is known 
as the “fine structure” of the spectral lines. But in 1916 Arnold Sommerfeld—de-
idealizing and expanding on Bohr’s theory—derived a formula which predicted the fine 
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structure of the hydrogen spectrum with stunning accuracy. In fact, the formula he 
derived is the very same formula used today for the fine structure energy levels of 
hydrogen, although today it stands on completely different theoretical foundations 
(including the Schrödinger equation and electron spin). Kronig calls this ‘perhaps the 
most remarkable numerical coincidence in the history of physics’ (cited in Kragh 1985, 
84). Kragh puts it as follows: 
 
By some sort of historical magic, Sommerfeld managed in 1916 to get the correct 
formula from what turned out to be an utterly inadequate model…[This] illustrates the 
well-known fact that incorrect physical theories may well lead to correct formulae and 
predictions. (Ibid.) 
 
Brown et al. (1995) write that ‘Sommerfeld’s answer has to be considered a fluke’ (p.92). 
The flavour of this literature is clearly anti-realist, and most realists would be keen to 
respond by explaining the success in another way. The success isn’t a matter of luck, 
they would want to say—it is born of truth buried within the theory. But can this be 
demonstrated? 
 The first job of this paper will be to show that these cases really should worry the 
realist. The modern, sophisticated realist does not profess to be moved by the ‘mere’ 
explanatory success of theories, but demands ‘novel predictive success’.5 This will be 
examined in §2, and the candidacy of Bohr’s success and Sommerfeld’s success for the 
realism debate will be made clearer in §§2.1 and 2.2 respectively. Then in §3 I will go 
into the details of Bohr’s derivation of the Rydberg constant and the spectral lines of 
ionised helium, and ask whether the reason he was so successful was because of the 
truth content hidden within his theory (judging by current theory). Drawing on Norton 
(2000) it will be shown that the selective realist strategy does have some chance of 
succeeding here. But then in §4 I will argue that this strategy almost certainly can’t work 
for Sommerfeld’s derivation of the fine structure formula for hydrogen. Finally in §5, the 
conclusion, I sum up what this means for realism. 
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2. Two Successes of Old Quantum Theory. The question of this section will be 
whether Bohr’s success vis-à-vis the spectral lines of hydrogen and ionised helium, and 
Sommerfeld’s success vis-à-vis the fine structure of hydrogen, were significant enough 
to make the realist take notice. They are usually referred to as explanatory successes, 
whereas the modern realist usually demands predictive success in order to make a 
realist commitment. However, often what became explanations started out as 
predictions: eg. big-bang cosmology originally predicted the microwave background 
radiation, and now it explains why we see this radiation. This is how we should 
understand certain successes of OQT that are now referred to as ‘explanations’. What’s 
important to the realism debate is that they started out as predictions. 
Psillos (1999, p.105ff)—drawing on Earman—distinguishes two types of prediction: 
‘use-novel’ and ‘temporally-novel’. A theory that achieves the latter is most obviously 
successful: it predicts some phenomenon that we are completely unaware of at the time. 
In the case of ‘use-novel’ predictions the phenomenon is already known about, but the 
theory is put together as if it isn’t known about. In this case the prediction has less 
psychological impact but, as Psillos argues, any theory deserves just as much credit for 
achieving it. As we will see (and as discussed further in Robotti (1986) and elsewhere) 
the theories of Bohr and Sommerfeld achieved both types of predictive success: use-
novel for lines already known about, and temporally-novel for lines not known about at 
the time the theories were proposed. Even the more careful brand of realist ought to be 
moved by these successes.6 
 
2.1. Relevant History 1: Bohr. The story of Bohr’s success is often misreported. His 
original ‘explanation’ of the spectral lines of hydrogen was not very convincing at all, and 
many saw it as ‘merely an ingenious play with numbers and formulas’ (Heilbron and 
Kuhn 1969, p.266). Even if it did persuade some in the community, the modern day 
realist certainly wouldn’t need to take notice. The problem is that, when Bohr derived the 
Balmer formula in 1913, he clearly knew what he was trying to derive—the spectral lines 
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of hydrogen—and in the earliest version of his theory he manipulates certain 
assumptions so as to make his theory fit the phenomena. His derivation ‘contained an 
arbitrary deviation from the theory of Planck, justified only by its success in giving the 
right result.’ (Norton 2000, p.83).7 This certainly isn’t what convinced Einstein, and so 
many others, to commit to the theory.  
 Things became much more convincing when Bohr re-structured his theory so as to 
explicitly include a formula encoding the frequencies of the spectral lines as part of his 
theory. In other words the theory didn’t make any attempt to derive the spectral lines 
anymore. Instead he merely hypothesised a mechanism for them, and the derivation of 
interest became that of the Rydberg constant. As Heilbron and Kuhn put it, 
 
He took the Balmer formula, interpreted from the start as a statement about energy 
levels, as his point of departure, and could deduce only the value of the multiplicative 
constant, the Rydberg coefficient. (Ibid., p.277, see also p.270) 
 
This was pretty impressive. Scientists had long had an empirical measure of the 
Rydberg constant from the Balmer formula, but now Bohr had presented a way of 
deriving it theoretically, in terms of primitive constants (such as the charge of the 
electron). And in 1913 the agreement between the empirically measured value and 
Bohr’s theoretically derived value was within one percent (Heilbron and Kuhn, p.266, 
fn.140), close enough for Einstein to exclaim, ‘Very remarkable! There must be 
something behind it. I do not believe that the derivation of the absolute value of the 
Rydberg constant is purely fortuitous.’ (Jammer 1966, p.86). Clearly what we have here 
is a ‘no miracles’ intuition: Einstein’s thought is that it just isn’t reasonable to assume that 
such quantitatively accurate success could be born of assumptions that are not at least 
approximately true. 
 However, even this isn’t what convinced most people to commit seriously to Bohr’s 
theory. Within a few months Alfred Fowler (1913) had objected that when one applies 
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Bohr’s theory to ionised helium the predictions are outside experimental error.8 But Bohr 
noted that Fowler’s calculation was based on an idealization assumption: namely that 
the nucleus of the atom is infinitely heavy compared with the mass of the electron. Bohr 
showed that when one makes the relevant de-idealization the predictions match 
experiment to five significant figures (see quotation above). It is this success which 
motivated Einstein to remark that the ‘theory of Bohr must then be right’. This is so 
persuasive because what we have here is quite obviously novel predictive success: both 
use-novel predictive success (for lines already known about) and temporally-novel 
predictive success (for new lines). Thus this really is the kind of thing that should draw 
the attention of the realist. One needn’t be a ‘naïve optimist’ as Einstein’s remark 
suggests: that is, one needn’t assume that Bohr’s theory must be right to be so 
successful.9 But the modern day realist does at least want to say that such success is 
usually born of truth, so this certainly counts as a case which matters to the realism 
debate.10 
 
2.2. Relevant History 2: Sommerfeld. The fine structure of hydrogen had been noticed as 
early as 1887 by Michelson and Morley. At least three serious measurements of the line 
known as Hα were taken—in 1891, 1895 and 1912—before Sommerfeld developed his 
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theory in 1916.11 There is no doubt that Sommerfeld knew about the fine structure at the 
time he was developing Bohr’s theory. If we want to describe Sommerfeld’s success as 
‘use-novel’ predictive success, we need to be sure that Sommerfeld did not manipulate 
his development of the theory to ensure it predicted the fine structure. 
 On this issue opinions are divided. Kragh writes, 
 
Sommerfeld’s theory of fine structure, although inspired by experimental results on 
the Balmer series, was not specifically designed to explain the hydrogen spectrum. 
On the contrary, it was part of a general program of quantum theory that proved to 
have many applications. (p.71) 
 
But Arabatzis (criticising a similar sentiment courtesy of Dudley Shapere) writes, 
‘Sommerfeld expected that this manoeuvre [introducing a second quantum number] 
would … resolve the problem of fine structure.’ (2006, p.149). 
 Arabatzis’s thought appears to be this: Sommerfeld certainly knew that he needed 
extra energy levels to predict the fine structure, and he quickly realised that these 
wouldn’t appear if electrons could orbit the atom in all possible ellipses, at any given 
eccentricity. Thus Sommerfeld’s qualitative prediction of more spectral lines should not 
count as ‘use-novel’—this really was written into the theory in its construction. However, 
what is really impressive about Sommerfeld’s prediction is the quantitative agreement 
between theory and experiment, and this certainly wasn’t written into the theory in its 
construction. Here we again have use-novel prediction for the lines already known, and 
also temporally novel prediction for new lines.12 
 Thus even at the time Sommerfeld’s fine structure formula was seen as making a 
novel prediction, which was subsequently confirmed by Friedrich Paschen. Paschen 
wrote to Sommerfeld in 1916, 
 
My measurements are now finished and they agree everywhere most beautifully with 
your fine structures. (cited in Kragh, p.75) 
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The agreement was quantitative and not merely qualitative, as Sommerfeld 
subsequently proclaimed (Kragh, p.76). 
 As Kragh continues, 
 
Sommerfeld’s theory was generally considered to be excellently confirmed by 
experiments… To many physicists the theory was the final proof of the soundness of 
Bohr’s quantum theory of the atom. For example, in letters of 1916 Einstein called 
Sommerfeld’s theory “a revelation.” “Your investigation of the spectra belongs among 
my most beautiful experiences in physics. Only through it do Bohr’s ideas become 
completely convincing.” Paul Epstein was converted to Bohr’s theory only “after 
Sommerfeld in his theory of the fine structure of the hydrogen lines achieved such a 
striking agreement with the experiment.” 
 During the reign of the old quantum theory, that is, until 1926, Sommerfeld’s 
explanation of the fine structure was regarded as undisputable by the leading atomic 
physicists. (p.80) 
 
In fact, as Kragh goes on to note, Max Planck compared Sommerfeld’s explanation of 
the fine structure with LeVerrier’s explanation of deviations in the orbit of Saturn in terms 
of an unseen planet which came to be called Neptune. The suggestion was that 
Sommerfeld’s success provided very strong evidence that there really are quantized 
elliptical orbits, just as there really is a planet beyond Saturn which we now call 
Neptune.13 
 However, Robotti (1986) has argued that the community wasn’t quite as convinced as 
Kragh’s paper makes out. She mentions several experiments carried out between 1916 
and 1925 that seemed to go against the theory to one degree or another. Thus some in 
the community argued that the Sommerfeld predictions were not confirmed by 
experiment. In 1924 Lau even went as far as to remark ‘For the hydrogen doublet series 
there exists so far no theoretical explanation which can be considered good.’ (cited in 
Robotti, p.46). The realist might try to make something of this, and argue that 
Sommerfeld’s theory was not very successful, and so they don’t need to make a realist 
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commitment. But my argument can’t work unless the realist is motivated to make realist 
commitment in this case. 
 In fact I think the finer details of the history do support my argument here. The key 
point is that at the time, everything taken into account, the evidence was seen as 
overwhelming by the vast majority of the relevant individuals. Now, with hindsight, we of 
course see small discrepancies between theory and experiment (especially regarding 
spectral line intensities) as indications that something was wrong. And it is tempting to 
regard isolated objections to Sommerfeld’s theory as prescient. But in fact any 
discrepancies between theory and experiment were not seen as problematic at the time 
by the vast majority of the relevant experts, and with good reason. In particular, as 
Robotti discusses in detail, minor discrepancies could be explained away in perfectly 
sensible ways. Here are the main points: 
 
(i) There were many issues concerning exactly how best to carry out the experiments, 
and many sources of error inevitably crept into the experimental process (eg. as 
detailed in Table 6 on p.83 of Robotti’s paper); 
(ii) Some measure of electrical field disturbance was inevitable, and Kramers (in 1919) 
was influential in explaining discrepancies between theory and experiment in 
terms of such electric fields (as Robotti explains in section 3 of her paper and 
elsewhere). As Kramers put it in 1919 ‘[T]his does not constitute a difficulty for 
the theory but it is just what should be expected according to the above 
considerations of the effect of perturbing fields on the fine structure.’ (cited in 
Robotti, p.73); 
(iii) There were further possible de-idealizations to be made to Sommerfeld’s theory, 
any of which could explain small discrepancies between theory and experiment 
(Robotti, p.99, fn.163); 
(iv) Where Sommerfeld’s theory did fail was in the ‘selection rules’, which Sommerfeld 
added to his theory ‘ad hoc’ (as Robotti explains on p.59). These were added to 
explain the spectral line intensities, but here the successes I am concerned with 
are the spectral line frequencies. Sommerfeld’s theory predicts these exactly (see 
below); 
(v) Finally, the biggest problems for Sommerfeld’s theory came several years after 
1916, so that there was at the very least a considerable period when belief in the 
theory was fully justified. Eg. Robotti writes ‘[I]n 1925 the problem of the fine 
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structure ... was no longer considered as definitely and thoroughly solved.’ (p.67). 
And Lau’s comment (above) came in 1924. But several years of success is more 
than enough for present purposes. 
 
 Of course, how convinced the community was by the fine-structure predictions is only 
indirect evidence that the realist ought to take notice of this episode in the history of 
science. Sometimes scientists have committed to theories which were not particularly 
successful, and which the modern day realist would not feel obliged to consider. 
However, in this case the level of success of the theory is clear: Sommerfeld derived the 
exact same formula used today for the fine structure energy levels of hydrogen. That is, 
Sommerfeld reached the exact same formula we get from the modern-day fully-
relativistic Dirac formulation of QM. There are differences between the old and the new 
theories regarding spectral lines intensities, but not regarding spectral lines frequencies. 
It is predictions of the latter that I am concerned with here. 
 
3. Bohr’s Derivation of the Spectral Lines of Ionised Helium.14 Norton (2000) has 
done much of the work required to explain the success of Bohr’s derivation in realist 
terms (although Norton’s reconstruction isn’t actually part of an argument for realism15). 
Bohr’s first significant success was a derivation of the Rydberg constant, as explained in 
§2.1, above. For Bohr’s derivation of this constant I will closely follow Norton (2000, 
pp.83-86). 
 Bohr’s assumptions were as follows: 
 
 (1):  The electrostatic model of electron orbits: the electron in the hydrogen atom 
orbits the nucleus, held in its orbit by a Coulomb attraction. 
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 (2):  Indexing of electron orbits: the electron can only orbit the nucleus at certain 
energies E. These energies are indexed by the formula: )(nfEn  , for some as yet 
unspecified function of (integer) n. 
 
 (3):  Emission of light by quanta: light is emitted when an electron jumps from one 
allowed orbit to another, less energetic orbit. The frequency   of the emitted light is 
given by the formula hEE nn  12  (drawing on Einstein’s formula hE  ). 
 
 (4):  The Balmer formula: the frequencies of light emitted by hydrogen are given by the 
Balmer formula: 









2
1
2
2
,
11
12
nn
Rnn , where 2n  and 1n  span over the 
corresponding energies of the orbiting electrons as per premises (2) and (3). From 
(2), (3) and (4) we have it that the energies of the possible orbits are given by 
2n
hR
En   for n = 1,2,3,4…. 
 
 (5):  Classical electrodynamics governs emissions for large quantum numbers: 
When n is large, and thus the electron is relatively far from the nucleus, the emitted 
frequency can be calculated according to classical electrodynamics (the electron 
behaves classically, more or less). Now according to classical theory a particle with 
mechanical frequency (frequency of revolution) n  and energy En circling a central 
charge Ze (under the influence of coulomb attraction) emits light with that same 
frequency n  such that: 422
3
2 2
emZ
En
n

  . Combining this with premise (4) we find 
that 
6422
33
2 2
nemZ
hR
n

   for electrons far enough away from the nucleus.16 
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Now, using (4), for large enough quantum number n we have it that,  
 
3221,
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Bohr can then compare this frequency with the one derived classically for large quantum 
numbers as follows: 
 
2
36422
33 22
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From here a simple calculation yields 
3
422
h
me
R

 , since Z=1 for hydrogen. So we 
have a theoretical derivation of the Rydberg constant, which can be compared with the 
one measured empirically using Balmer’s formula. As noted in §2.1, the two results 
match almost perfectly.17 
 From here the challenge is to apply Bohr’s theory to ionised helium. Now, instead of 
merely predicting the value of the Rydberg constant, Bohr’s theory predicts the spectral 
lines of ionised helium. It tells us that the setup is very similar to that of the hydrogen 
atom, with the one significant difference being that the charge on the nucleus is doubled. 
This means that the Rydberg constant changes, since Z=2 instead of 1. But it is still the 
case that the possible energies of the electron orbits are given by the formula 
2n
hR
En  , 
although now ‘R’ stands for the new Rydberg constant, which we can label R2. So the 
predicted frequencies of the spectral lines of ionised helium are given by,  
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So in other words the only extra assumption Bohr needs in order to predict the spectral 
lines of ionised helium is that the positive charge on the nucleus is doubled. And of 
course, as noted in §2.1, the predictions are extremely successful.18 
 The crucial question for the realist is how it is possible for Bohr’s theory to be so 
successful when we now know that it is so far off the mark (in the light of modern 
quantum theory). At first it seems that the success can be explained with a relatively 
simple selective realist move, following Norton (2000, pp.86-88). The point is that Bohr’s 
assumptions about electron orbits appear to play no role in the derivation given above; 
they are just heuristically useful. The derivation still goes through if one merely assumes 
that the electrons can persist in different possible ‘stationary states’, each with an 
associated energy 
2n
hR
En  . And, crucially, this assumption is already a part of Bohr’s 
original assumption set. Of course he added the extra assumption that the reason 
electrons have these energies is because of the kinetic and potential energies of their 
orbits. But this extra assumption doesn’t play any part in the derivation of either the 
Rydberg constant or the spectral lines of ionised helium. As Norton writes, 
 
The reduced form [of the derivation] eschews all talk of elliptical orbits other than in 
the domain of correspondence with classical theory… No assumption is made or 
needed that these stationary states are elliptical orbits of some definite size and 
frequency of localised electrons. What is retained is that these states possess a 
definite energy. (2000, pp.86-87) 
 
Building on this the realist would claim that all of the assumptions truly necessary to 
Bohr’s derivation are still true according to the new quantum theory. As Norton puts it, 
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[A]ll of the assumptions of this reduced demonstrative induction [“derivation”
19
] are 
compatible with the new quantum mechanics that emerged in the 1920s. The 
stationary states …, for example, would simply correspond to the energy eigenstates 
of a bound electron.
20
 
 
 A possible objection to this story would be that Bohr still draws on assumption (5), 
which makes use of the assumption of elliptical orbits for very large quantum numbers 
(in the ‘domain of correspondence with classical theory’, as Norton puts it). Some might 
be tempted to claim that this is crucial to Bohr’s derivation, but not even approximately 
true according to modern QM. Another worry might be the way in which Bohr answered 
Fowler’s objections, as noted in §2.1 above. Bohr drew on the assumption of real 
electron orbits to argue that the nucleus does not stay absolutely stationary, but 
‘wobbles’ due to its attraction to the electron. Prima facie it would appear that without the 
assumption of real electron orbits Bohr’s ‘reduced mass’ assumption makes no sense, 
and without this latter assumption Bohr cannot achieve the really startling success which 
made Einstein remark ‘the theory of Bohr must then be right’.  
 Whether these two objections to the realist’s story can be satisfactorily answered is a 
question I leave for selective realists. Once one has taken away what is radically false 
from the Bohr theory, is there enough left for the successful derivations to go through? 
One thing worth emphasising here is that the selective realist cannot answer as follows: 
 
It doesn’t matter if just one or two assumptions used in the derivation of a novel 
prediction are not-even-approximately-true. As long as the vast majority are, one can 
maintain that the theory as a whole is approximately true, and that this explains the 
success. 
 
On the contrary, all of the ‘working posits’ must be at least approximately true if the 
success of the theory is to be explained in terms of truth. Consider a successful 
prediction P which can be derived from assumptions A – E. If A – D are at-least-
                                            
19
 There is no difficulty here: a ‘reduced demonstrative induction’ is a type of derivation. See 
Norton’s paper for details. 
20
 The modification of assumptions 1-5 (above) required for the reduced derivation is 
straightforward. Simply put, the ‘orbits’ aren’t doing any work, and the derivation goes through just 
the same if one swaps talk of orbits for talk of ‘stationary states’ with certain energies (see Norton 
2000, pp.86-87 for the details). 
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approximately-true, but E is radically false, then the truth in the theory does not explain 
the success at all. The success in question, prediction P, doesn’t follow from what the 
theory got (approximately) right, namely A – D; it only follows if we include the radically 
false assumption E. Thus the realist fails in her basic aim: to explain the success of 
science in terms of truth.21 
 In the specific case of Bohr’s derivation of the spectral lines of ionised helium, it may 
yet be possible to show that all of the relevant ‘working posits’ are approximately true. 
Work remains to be done, but I think the realist is already in a tight spot. However, in a 
sense it is immaterial whether the realist can answer her critics on these points: things 
are about to get significantly more difficult. 
 
4. Sommerfeld’s Derivation of the Fine Structure of Hydrogen. Sommerfeld took 
Bohr’s theory as a starting point and developed it significantly. He noted first that for 
every allowed energy 
2n
hR
En   in Bohr’s model there should (classically speaking) be 
an infinite number of possible orbits, because there are an infinite number of 
eccentricities of ellipse which could describe the electron’s trajectory (ranging from very 
long and thin ellipses to circles). Motivated by various empirical phenomena (including 
the fine-structure, see above), Sommerfeld postulated that only certain eccentricities of 
ellipse are possible trajectories for the electron. For the smallest energy E1 there is just 
one possible orbit, a circle. For the second smallest energy E2 there are two possible 
orbits, a circle and an ellipse with a given eccentricity. For the third smallest energy E3 
there are three possible orbits, and so on. These possible orbits are all indexed by a 
second quantum number k, in addition to Bohr’s principal quantum number n. 
                                            
21
 In addition, imagine what such a realist would have to say about current scientific theories. 
Even if we could determine the ‘working posits’ of our very best theories responsible for 
successful predictions (something doubted by anti-realists), such a realist would have to say that 
any one of these posits could be radically false. Thus our confidence in even the working posits of 
our best theories would be undermined, and it isn’t nearly as clear what such realists could claim 
to know about the unobservable world. 
 16 
 But Sommerfeld does not stop here. His next move is to apply the laws of special 
relativity to the different possible electron trajectories.22 In essence, Sommerfeld makes 
use of the equation for a precessing elliptical orbit, but introduces relativity by making a 
change to the equation for angular momentum: 
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Here m0 is the ‘bare’ mass, m is the relativistic mass, r is the distance between the 
electron and the proton, and ω is the angular rate of rotation. One then has a relativistic 
equation for a precessing elliptical orbit, which can be arranged to tell us the energy of 
an electron in such an orbit. 
 Introducing the two quantum numbers n and k we find that different orbits which 
before had the same energy (same n, different k) now have very slightly different 
energies. It is these very slightly different energies which explain the very closely 
grouped spectral lines which we call the “fine-structure”. With these assumptions 
Sommerfeld is led to the following formula for the allowed energies of the hydrogen 
atom: 
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Here c is the speed of light, α ≈ 1/137, and the dots stand for negligible terms.23  
 As noted above in §2.2, this formula is still accepted as the correct expression of the 
hydrogen energy levels. But today the explanation of the fine-structure is completely 
different, in particular because the derivation of the fine-structure formula is completely 
                                            
22
 In fact, Bohr was the first to introduce elliptical orbits, and even attempted to apply special 
relativity (see Nisio 1973, p.54ff.). But Sommerfeld was the first to see these developments 
through rigorously. 
23
 For further details of Sommerfeld’s derivation see eg. Arabatzis 2006, p.158ff, or see Nisio 
1973 for the full history. The extra details will not matter to my forthcoming argument that the 
selective realist strategy almost certainly won’t work here. 
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different.24 For example, orbital trajectories play no part whatsoever in the new QM. 
Instead one starts with the time-independent Schrödinger equation, 
 
 EH  
 
where H is the Hamiltonian operator: 
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For the hydrogen atom V(x) is the familiar Coulomb potential, which in polar co-ordinates 
can be written as, 
 
r
e
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Now if we solve the Schrödinger equation in this form, the energy levels for the hydrogen 
atom turn out to be the same as those predicted by Bohr’s theory (for the full derivation 
see Eisberg and Resnick p.235ff.). But now it is possible to make corrections to the 
Hamiltonian to account for relativity and electron spin. 
 First, instead of assuming the (classical) relation between (kinetic) energy and 
momentum E=p2/2m, one can make use of the relativistic alternative: 
 
42222 cmcE  p . 
 
The first term in the above (non-relativistic) Hamiltonian can be reached by starting with 
E=p2/2m and substituting p for the corresponding operator:  ip . If one does the 
                                            
24
 Some structural realists might focus on the fact that we have the same equation and claim that 
this shows that Sommerfeld had latched onto the right ‘structure’ of the world, which explains the 
success. In fact, most realists wouldn’t count this as a realist position at all: what needs to be 
explained is how Sommerfeld managed to reach the fine-structure formula. 
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same substitution but now with the relativistic alternative, one reaches a new, 
relativistically corrected Hamiltonian.25 In its unrefined form we have, 
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 In addition there is a correction due to the electron ‘spin’, and thus a final Hamiltonian 
which can be expressed as, 
 
SPINRELFINAL HHH   
 
In short, the electron is said to have an ‘intrinsic angular momentum’ S, which causes it 
to interact with the field of the proton about which it is orbiting. Thus the result is 
something referred to as the ‘spin-orbit’ interaction. The resultant correction factor to the 
Hamiltonian is, 
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where L is the regular ‘orbital’ angular momentum (mvr).26 
 With these corrections to the Hamiltonian, one has only to solve the Schrödinger 
equation and Sommerfeld’s fine-structure formula re-emerges as if by magic. At least, 
almost exactly the same formula emerges (see below for discussion). It turns out that 
two quantum numbers have to be introduced—just as in Sommerfeld’s theory—to avoid 
physically unacceptable results. Of course, the quantum numbers are interpreted 
differently in the new theory (see Series 1988, p.24), but the restricted range over which 
these numbers can span is exactly the same as in Sommerfeld’s theory. 
                                            
25
 Cf. Series (1988), p.26. 
26
 For the details see Burkhardt et al. (2006), p.128ff. Cf. Eisberg and Resnick, p.284ff. Burkhardt 
et al. consider a third term in the ‘final’ Hamiltonian, called the ‘Darwin Term’ (p.130). However, 
this can be ignored for present purposes: at any rate, it plays a role ‘only when the orbital angular 
momentum is zero’ (Ibid.). 
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 As we saw earlier, the feeling in the physics community is certainly not that 
Sommerfeld’s success is born of truth; instead, they see it as a lucky coincidence: 
 
That these two theories [the old and the new QM] lead to essentially the same results for 
the hydrogen atom is a coincidence that caused much confusion in the 1920s, when the 
modern quantum theories were being developed. The coincidence occurs because the 
errors made by the Sommerfeld model, in ignoring the spin-orbit interaction and in using 
classical mechanics to evaluate the average energy shift due to the relativistic 
dependence of mass on velocity, happen to cancel for the case of the hydrogen atom. 
(Eisberg and Resnick, p.286) 
 
But perhaps we shouldn’t think of it as two errors cancelling each other out, as if we 
have a positive and a negative which cancel to give zero. If you take away these ‘errors’ 
from OQT you certainly don’t get the right result: you get nothing at all! Instead, it just so 
happens that the work done by the Sommerfeld model in introducing a second quantum 
number to restrict the possible elliptical orbits, and then applying special relativity to 
those orbits, is exactly equivalent (as far as the end result is concerned) to the work 
done in modern QM by (i) applying relativistic effects to quantum mechanics, and (ii) 
taking spin-orbit interaction into account. 
 How can the selective realist respond? Despite the vast difference between the 
provenance of the fine-structure formula in the old and new QM, the selective realist 
might still insist that old QM has enough in common with the new QM to explain 
Sommerfeld’s success in terms of what he got right. After all, Sommerfeld was right in 
thinking that hydrogen atoms consist of one proton and one electron, that there is a 
Coulomb potential caused by the positive charge of the proton nucleus, that the energies 
of the possible electron states are quantized, that photon emission is caused by 
transitions between electron states, and so on. This all resides within the new QM just as 
it resides within the old QM. But of course, this isn’t enough. The issue is whether 
Sommerfeld’s success is due to what he got right, whether all of the assumptions which 
play an essential role in Sommerfeld’s derivation are at least approximately true. 
 One might simply say that, on the face of it, Sommerfeld drew on assumptions which 
are clearly false according to the new theory, that his derivation is dependant upon 
assumptions about elliptical trajectories and the effect of relativity on those trajectories. 
However, we can do better than this. 
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 Consider Figure 1. On the left hand side modern QM is represented as a body of 
assumptions, with electron ‘spin’ being one of these assumptions. Spin is a necessary 
part of the derivation of the fine-structure formula in the new QM, as noted above. In fact 
it is explicitly stated in relevant literature everywhere that the fine-structure splitting is 
caused by spin-orbit interaction.27 On Figure 1 this is signalled by the fact that there is an 
arrow leading from ‘spin’ to the ‘fine-structure formula’ on the diagram. But of course 
electron spin, even in a classical sense, is not playing a role in OQT. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of how the fine-structure follows from the new QM, and how 
the selective realist wants it to follow from the old QM. The elliptical ‘egg’ on the right hand side 
(RHS) represents the subset of assumptions OQT got right, according to the new QM. 
 
 Herein lies a major difficulty for the selective realist. Such a realist wants to say that 
the fine-structure formula is ultimately born of assumptions Sommerfeld was right about, 
represented by the ‘egg’ on the RHS of Figure 1. Thus, in the (realist) hope that this is 
true, an arrow on the diagram points from the ‘egg’ of truth on the RHS to the fine-
structure formula in the middle. But, since all of those assumptions are true according to 
the new theory, they are in the new theory, and that same ‘egg’ appears on the LHS. It 
follows that, if the selective realist is right, one could draw an arrow from the ‘egg’ on the 
LHS to the fine-structure formula. But that would show that spin isn’t a necessary part of 
                                            
27
 Eg. Letokhov and Johansson (2009), p.37: ‘The interaction between the spin and the electron’s 
orbit is called spin-orbit interaction, which contributes energy and causes the fine-structure 
splitting.’ 
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the explanation of the fine-structure formula in the new QM! But, since it is a necessary 
part, a simple application of modus tollens tells us that the arrow on the RHS cannot 
extend all the way into the ‘egg’ of truth within Sommerfeld’s theory. The conclusion is 
that Sommerfeld’s derivation of the fine-structure formula necessarily draws on at least 
some false assumptions within his theory.28 
 There is still one last hope for the selective realist here. In 1928 Dirac showed that, if 
one develops quantum mechanics in a fully relativistic way, electron spin ‘drops out’ of 
the formalism, and doesn’t have to be ‘bolted on’ as a separate assumption, as in the 
above analysis.29 And it is really this version of modern QM that delivers exactly the 
same fine structure formula as Sommerfeld’s theory.30 The realist might then suggest 
that Fig.1 misrepresents the situation. ‘Spin’ on the left hand side—they might claim—
should go inside the egg on the left hand side, and therefore also inside the egg on the 
right hand side. Sommerfeld’s old 1916 theory, they would have to claim, does implicitly 
include ‘spin’ effects (they are somehow ‘buried’ within the theory). 
 This seems to be a highly implausible response, however. Even if we can say, with 
Dirac, that spin ‘drops out’ of a fully relativistic development of the new QM, we can’t say 
that it follows from relativity alone. Thus the fact that Sommerfeld’s theory includes 
relativity as a part is nowhere near enough for realist purposes. I find it impossible to 
fathom how spin could be ‘hiding’ in Sommerfeld’s theory. In Dirac’s treatment of the 
hydrogen atom it turns out that the electron has a certain, special, quantum property, 
and its having that property brings about the fine-structure splitting. In Sommerfeld’s 
                                            
28
 An appeal to approximate truth will not help. Any approximately true assumptions can be made 
true by an operation I have elsewhere called ‘internalising the approximation’ (Vickers 
forthcoming). For example, if x=y is approximately true, then (internalising the approximation) x≈y 
is true. I am assuming that all such assumptions are included within the ‘egg’ of truth on the RHS 
of Figure 1. 
29
 Although the precise nature of this ‘dropping out of the formalism’ is still debated. See Morrison 
(2004) for discussion. 
30
 The slightly earlier, Schrödinger-Heisenberg QM therefore comes 3
rd
 place insofar as the fine-
structure formula is concerned, ranking behind not just the 1928 Dirac QM, but also the 1916 
Sommerfeld theory! (See Biedenharn 1983 for further details.) 
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theory the electron has no similar property whatsoever (it is not even spinning on its axis 
like a ball).31 
 Simply put, if the selective realist could make this work, it would be a startling new 
development in our understanding of spin, and what causes the fine-structure splitting. 
This seems extremely unlikely: modern quantum mechanics has now reached an 
outstanding level of maturity, and any suggestion that one of its explanations is 
misguided is not to be tolerated without very good reason. The dictates of selective 
realism do not represent a good reason at all, relatively speaking. Thus, even if the 
selective realist strategy can work for Bohr’s prediction of the spectral lines of ionised 
helium, it seems safe to assume that it fails for Sommerfeld’s prediction of the fine-
structure formula. If there is another way, the burden of proof lies squarely with the 
realist. 
 
5. Ramifications for Realism. How should the realist respond to this historical episode? 
First of all I should acknowledge that I have hardly proved that the selective realist’s 
favoured strategy cannot work for the Sommerfeld case. There may still exist truths or 
approximate truths buried within Sommerfeld’s theory which allow the derivation to go 
through. It seems highly unlikely—in particular because the spin-orbit interaction of 
modern QM appears to have no counterpart whatsoever in the Sommerfeld model (circa 
1916 when the derivation was made)—but many selective realists allow that the truths in 
question can be highly abstract and far from obvious (cf. Saatsi 2005). It’s not clear what 
it would take to show beyond all doubt that there is no possible reconstruction of a given 
derivation in terms of what the theory got at least approximately right. 
  In fact, a paper by Biedenharn (1983) shows how it might be possible for the selective 
realist to proceed here. Biedenharn shows that there is a formal correspondence 
between what he calls the ‘Sommerfeld derivation’ and the ‘Dirac derivation’. Whether 
this correspondence is one the selective realist can draw upon is an open question, and 
a task I leave to such realists. Biedenharn makes quite substantial changes to both the 
old and the new derivations, employing some quite technical and complex mathematics, 
                                            
31
 There were certain developments of Sommerfeld’s theory in the early 1920s (eg. new quantum 
numbers) that could be interpreted, perhaps, as surrogates for spin (thanks to an anonymous 
referee for pointing this out). However, this doesn’t help the realist explain why Sommerfeld’s 
theory was successful before 1920, and in particular when he made his derivation of the fine 
structure formula in 1916.  
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to achieve the correspondence. Are such extravagant formal manipulations a legitimate 
way for the realist to show that the old theory does indeed contain enough truth (in the 
light of the new theory) to explain its successes? It seems clear at the very least that not 
all selective realists could say so. Only realists who focus on continuity of highly abstract 
‘structure’ across theory change could be satisfied with this: structural realists who follow 
in the footsteps of Worrall (1989). But of course, many selective realists want to be 
realists about much more than mere ‘structure’. If the realist has to say that it only looks 
like Sommerfeld’s relativistic elliptical orbits of electrons are essential features of his 
derivation, but that they aren’t really essential, then there seems to be nothing stopping 
the anti-realist saying the same thing about apparently ‘essential’ components of current 
successful science. This has been emphasised by Kyle Stanford (2009) and others: if 
one can show that so little is ‘essential’ to a theory’s success, then the selective realist 
ends up not being able to commit to many features of modern scientific theories that she 
most definitely wants to commit to (according to the anti-realist). Or at least, the 
predictive success of theories tells us so very little about what we are entitled to commit 
to. 
Thus, in the end, many selective realists may prefer to let this example stand as a 
case that does go against their position. This wouldn’t be the end for selective realism—
far from it. The realist can suggest that OQT is ‘the exception which proves the rule’, that 
it truly is historical magic, a ‘little miracle’. Only the ‘naïve optimist’ says that every 
significant scientific success must be explainable in terms of truth (see Saatsi and 
Vickers 2010). A more sophisticated, more realistic realist says that success is usually 
born of truth, so that we have good reason to believe that modern scientific successes 
are born of the truth in our current scientific theories (although it remains possible that 
our current theories are radically false, despite their successes). Following this route, the 
realist might even claim that Norton’s ‘reduced derivation’ of the Rydberg constant goes 
in favour of the realist’s thesis almost as much as Sommerfeld’s success goes against it, 
so that one walks away from OQT with the books fairly evenly balanced. 
This move is representative of a general realist strategy that I have implicitly appealed 
to a few times in this paper, and which may look a little suspicious. Basically the move is, 
when faced with an apparent counterexample to one’s realist beliefs from the history of 
science, to say ‘Oh, that was just a simplification of my position! Actually I’m more 
sophisticated than that. What I really believe is…’ Five such ‘aspects of sophistication’ a 
realist might appeal to are as follows: 
 24 
 
(i) Success indicates at least approximate truth, not truth simpliciter; 
(ii) Commitment to only parts of a theory, not all of it (the selective realist move); 
(iii) Only predictive success is motivating, not (necessarily) explanatory success; 
(iv) Non-naive realism: success is only usually connected with truth; 
(v) If sufficiently successful, then realist commitment is warranted, but not only if 
sufficiently successful. 
 
So, a realist who wanted to put all of these together might say, 
 
When a theory achieves novel predictive success, then, probably (although not 
always), that means that the parts of the theory responsible for that success are 
at least approximately true (but such success is not the only reason one could 
have for making such a commitment).
32
 
 
Of course, the question arises whether the realist is justified in all of these ‘aspects of 
sophistication’, or whether they are introduced merely to get around difficult examples of 
historical evidence. For example, Stanford (2009, p.383) has complained that the realist 
focus on predictive success is not justified given various current theories—typically from 
the biological sciences—that any realist would want to believe in but that don’t achieve 
novel predictive success. In fact Stanford’s worry is unfounded given aspect (v) on the 
above list: a realist is free to make a commitment to theories that don’t achieve novel 
predictive successes. But similar worries about how the realist might justify (i)-(v) might 
be harder to shake off. 
 It is not my intention to explore these issues properly here, but what I can say is that 
even if the realist is granted all of these qualifications, OQT still stands as an important 
and relevant case study in the debate. Even the most ‘sophisticated’ realist position 
becomes increasingly implausible if further examples mount up of novel predictive 
success born of assumptions at least some of which are not even approximately true. In 
                                            
32
 Further qualifications are possible, of course. Couvalis (1997, p.75) writes: ‘Whewell grasped 
that it is not the successful prediction of scattered novel facts which is good evidence for the 
approximate truth of a research program. The reason for this is that a research program which is 
not even approximately true can easily produce occasionally successful predictions of novel facts 
by coincidence.’ This suggests another ‘predictions not scattered’ qualification, although whether 
the realist can fully justify it is an open question.  
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fact many prima facie examples—such as those on Laudan’s list (1981)—have now 
been dismissed by the realist as either not successful enough or as harbouring hidden 
truths which explain the success. But there may yet be further examples of the Bohr and 
Sommerfeld type out there to be found. The example recently introduced to the debate 
in Saatsi and Vickers (2010) is just such a relevant example. 
 Clearly much work remains to be done to establish just how today’s philosopher of 
science should respond to successful but false theories in the history of science. 
According to this author, we still haven’t collected enough evidence from the history of 
science to make an informed decision on realism. Selective realism seems to make 
good sense as a ‘working hypothesis’, but as no more than that. Until much more 
philosophically informed historical work has been done, intuitions and rhetoric will play 
an overly prominent role in the debate. The aim of the present paper is to indicate the 
way forward, and take a small step in the right direction. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I am grateful to Juha Saatsi and John Norton for discussion and criticism, and also to 
three anonymous referees for helpful comments. Thanks also to audiences at the 
University of Leeds (2009), and at the 2nd biennial conference of the European 
Philosophy of Science Association in Amsterdam in 2009, where early versions of this 
paper were presented. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Arabatzis, T. (2006): Representing Electrons. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Beidenharn, L. C. (1983): ‘The “Sommerfeld Puzzle” Revisited and Resolved’, Foundations of 
Physics, volume 13, no.1, pp.13-34. 
Bohr, N. (1913a): ‘On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules’, Philosophical Magazine (6), 26, 
pp.1-25, 476-502 and 857-875. 
_______ (1913b): ‘The Spectra of Helium and Hydrogen’, Nature 92, pp.231-232. 
_______ (1922): Theory of Spectra and Atomic Constitution. Cambridge University Press. 
Brown, L., Pais, A. and Pippard, A. (1995): Twentieth Century Physics. CRC Press. 
Burkhardt, C., Leventhal, J. L. and Leventhal, J. J. (2006): Topics in Atomic Physics. Birkhäuser. 
Chakravartty, A. (2007): A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 26 
Couvalis, G. (1997): The Philosophy of Science: Science and Objectivity. London: Sage 
Publications. 
Darwin, C. G. (1928): ‘The Wave Equations of the Electron’, Proceedings of the Royal Society 
(London) A, volume 118, issue 780, pp.654-689. 
Eisberg, R. and Resnick, R. (1985), Quantum physics of atoms, molecules, solids, and particles, 
2nd edition. New York: Wiley. 
Fowler, A. (1913): ‘The Spectra of Helium and Hyrogen’, Nature 92, pp.95-96. 
Heilbron, J. and Kuhn, T. (1969): The Genesis of the Bohr Atom. Historical Studies in the 
Physical Sciences, 1, pp.211-290. 
Jammer, M. (1966): The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics. McGraw-Hill. 
Jungnickel, C. and McCormmach, R. (1990): Intellectual Mastery of Nature. Theoretical Physics 
from Ohm to Einstein, Volume 2: The Now Mighty Theoretical Physics 1870-1925. University 
of Chicago Press. 
Kitcher, P. (1993): The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without 
Illusions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kragh, H. (1985): ‘The fine structure of hydrogen and the gross structure of the physics 
community, 1916-26’, Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 15: pp.67-125. 
Laudan, L. (1981): ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’, Philosophy of Science 48, pp.19-48. 
Letokhov, V. S. and Johansson, S. (2009): Astrophysical Lasers. Oxford University Press US. 
Morrison, M. (2004): ‘History and Metaphysics: On the Reality of Spin’, in J. Buchwald and A. 
Warwick (eds.) Histories of the Electron: The Birth of Microphysics, pp.425-449. MIT Press. 
Nisio, S. (1973): ‘The Formation of the Sommerfeld Quantum Theory of 1916’, Japanese Studies 
in the History of Science 12, pp.39-78. 
Norton, J. (2000): ‘How We Know About Electrons’, in R. Nola and H. Sankey (eds.), After 
Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, 2000, Kluwer, pp.67-97. 
Oliver, D. (2004): The Shaggy Steed of Physics. Springer. 
Pais, A. (1986): Inward Bound: of matter and forces in the physical world. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
_______ (1991): Niels Bohr’s Times, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Psillos, S. (1999): Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. London; New York: Routledge. 
Robotti, N. (1986): ‘The Hydrogen Spectroscopy and the Old Quantum Theory’, Rivista di Storia 
Della Scienza 3, pp.45-102. 
Saatsi, J. (2005): ‘Reconsidering the Fresnel-Maxwell case study’, Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science 36: pp.509-538. 
Saatsi, J. and Vickers, P. (2010): ‘Miraculous Success? Inconsistency and Untruth in Kirchhoff’s 
Diffraction Theory’, forthcoming in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 
Series, G. W. (1988): The Spectrum of Atomic Hydrogen: Advances. World Scientific. 
 27 
Stanford, P. K. (2006): Exceeding Our Grasp. Oxford, OUP. 
_______ (2009): ‘Author’s Response’, in ‘Grasping at Realist Straws’, a review symposium of 
Stanford (2006), Metascience 18, pp.355-390. 
Vickers, P. (forthcoming): ‘Theory Flexibility and Inconsistency in Science’, forthcoming in O. 
Bueno and P. Vickers (eds) Is Science Inconsistent? Special issue of Synthese. 
Worrall, J. (1989): ‘Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?’, Dialectica 43, pp.99-124. 
